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Rules of the Road: The Constitutional
Limits of Restricting Indecent Speech
on the Information Superhighway
Stacey J. Rappaport*
INTRODUCTION
There are many ways to communicate a dirty joke. A come-
dian can tell the joke to a crowd of people during an outdoor per-
formance in a park. A humorist can print the joke in a book, mag-
azine or newspaper. A comic can send copies of the joke through
the postal mail. A radio announcer can broadcast the joke over the
public airwaves. A teenager can call on a telephone and convey
the sordid narrative. An entrepreneur can establish a "dial-a-joke"
service where a caller dials a phone number to hear a recording of
the foul tale. A comedian can tell the joke on a cable television
program. And now, a computer user can access an on-line comput-
er service and "post" the joke on a computer bulletin board or send
it to selected addresses via electronic mail.
Under existing federal statutes, the radio announcer and the
teenager could be punished for their indecent verbal communica-
tions.' In contrast, the First Amendment's free speech provision
2
protects the comedian who tells the joke in the park,3 the entrepre-
* J.D. Candidate, 1996, Fordham University School of Law. This Note is dedicated
to my parents, Ellen, and Stephen Rappaport, and my brother, Hartley Rappaport, for their
constant love, support and encouragement. I would like to thank Professor Ann
Moynihan for her insight and inspiration.
1. See 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (prohibiting persons from making
indecent comments, requests, suggestions and proposals by telephone); FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (holding that government may restrict indecent radio broad-
casts).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom
of speech").
3. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (holding that First Amendment
protected defendant who wore jacket displaying phrase "Fuck the Draft" in courthouse
corridor).
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neur managing the call-in service,' the humorist who prints the joke
in a publication, the comic who mails the joke through the U.S.
mail,6 and the comedian who tells the joke during a cable television
program.7 A new wave of computer communications legislation,8
however, has made the computer user's fate unclear.
The proliferation of pornography and other offensive material
available on computer networks and through on-line services 9 has
prompted congressional representatives and senators to introduce
several bills that would regulate speech on computer networks.1 °
The first of these bills, introduced to the U.S. Senate, entitled the
4. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989) (hold-
ing that First Amendment prohibited ban on adult access to indecent telephone messages
that were not obscene).
5. See Papish v. Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (hold-
ing that First Amendment protected university newspaper political cartoon which depicted
policemen raping Statue of Liberty and Goddess of Justice, and newspaper headline story
entitled "Motherf - Acquitted" which discussed member of organization "Up Against
the Wall, Motherf-").
6. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983) (holding that
government could not prevent sender from sending mail unless the recipient could not
avoid objectionable speech contained in mail); cf. Rowan v. United States Post Office
Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (holding that government could prevent sender from sending
mail to addressee upon request from addressee).
7. See Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp 1099, 1117
(D. Utah 1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 480 U.S. 926 (1987) (holding
that First Amendment prohibited penalizing distributors of every indecent cable program
that was not obscene).
8. H.R. 1978, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 892, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995);
S. 714, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 1004, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 314,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
9. See, e.g., David Post, New Rules for the Net?, AM. LAW., July/Aug. 1995, at 112
(noting frequency of news reports of profane and pornographic electronic network trans-
missions); Steven Levy, No Place for Kids? A Parents' Guide to Sex on the Net., NEWS-
WEEK, July 3, 1995, at 47-48 (detailing abundance of sexual material on computer net-
works); Sebastian Rupley, Stomping out Cybersmut., PC MAG., July 1, 1995, at 29 (stating
that parents and teachers are outraged at proliferation of sexually explicit material on
Internet); James Derk, Sites for Nude Photos Hit on Internet, EVANSVILLE COURIER, May
17, 1995, at 5B ("[o]ne of the major attractions of the Internet is naked women"); Carol
Innerst, Anti-Porn Bill Makes Waves in Cyberspace; Issue Centers on Internet's Status
Under Law, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1995, at A4 (listing recent incidents involving traffic
of sexual material on Internet).
10. See H.R. 1978, supra note 8; S. 892, supra note 8; S. 714, supra note 8; H.R.
1004, supra note 8; S. 314, supra note 8.
[Vol. 6:301
1995] RESTRICTING INDECENT SPEECH ON THE INTERNET 303
Communications Decency Act of 1995 ("Communications De-
cency Act") would criminalize sending indecent written and visual
communication via computer. 2 The goal of the Communications
Decency Act is to enable children to use computer networks with-
out exposure to sexual conversations or images.
1 3
Another bill, the Protection of Children from Computer Por-
nography Act of 1995 ("Protection of Children from Computer
Pornography Act"),' 4 would prohibit computer transmission of
indecent material to minors 5 and would also impose liability on
on-line service providers who knowingly allow their services to be
used to transmit indecent material to persons under eighteen years
of age. 16 While both these bills may accomplish the legitimate
objective of protecting children from harmful or offensive material,
they may also seriously abridge the First Amendment rights of
adults.
Two other bills introduced to Congress in 1995 focus on giving
adults more control over children's access to material on computer
networks. The Child Protection, User Empowerment and Free
Expression in Interactive Media Study Act' 7 ("Leahy Amendment")
would direct the Department of Justice to study existing obscenity
laws and determine the enforceability of these laws on computer
transmitted communications. 8 The Leahy Amendment also calls
for an evaluation of available technology enabling parents to ex-
ercise control over the information children receive via computer
networks 9 and recommendations to encourage the development of
11. S. 314, supra note 8. A similar bill was introduced in the House of Representa-
tives. H.R. 1004, supra note 8.
12. S. 314, supra note 11; see Lawmakers Patrolling Info Superhighway, NEWSBYTES
NEWS NETWORK, Feb. 17, 1995, available in Westlaw, ALLNEWS Database.
13. Panelists Debate Electronic Privacy Issues, CNN News, Feb. 13, 1995, Transcript
# 1021-7 (Sen. Exon discussing goals of Communications Decency Act).
14. S. 892, supra note 8.
15. id. § 2.
16. Id. § 2(b)(2)-(3).
17. S. 714, supra note 8; 141 CONG. REC. S5548 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 1995).
18. S. 714, supra note 8, § 1(a).
19. Id. § I(a)(3)(A).
304 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
parental control technology.2 ° Similarly, the proposed Internet
Freedom and Family Empowerment Act2' ("Cox/Wyden Amend-
ment") seeks to promote the development of user-control technolo-
gies22 and preserve the free exchange of information on the Internet
without government intrusion.23
The enactment of one or more of these bills will determine
whether a computer user who transmits a dirty joke over a com-
puter network could be held criminally liable.' However, while the
First Amendment does not protect the radio announcer who broad-
casts a dirty joke,24 it could shield the computer user from liability.
Although the joke's content is the same regardless of the medium
in which the speaker chooses to communicate, the Supreme Court
has held that the medium through which the speaker delivers the
joke determines the speaker's level of constitutional protection.25
Because the Internet is a multifaceted network which consists of
many different media for expression, such as bulletin board sys-
tems, electronic mail, and real-time conferencing, its different
functions may receive different levels of constitutional protection.
Constitutional regulation of the Internet, therefore, depends upon
defining and distinguishing different Internet functions and the First
Amendment analyses that apply to those different functions.
20. Id. § I(a)(4).
21. H.R. 1978, supra note 8.
22. Id. § 2(b)(3).
23. Id. § 2(b)(2).,
24. See FCC v: Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (holding that government may
restrict indecent radio broadcasts).
25. See, e.g., Sable, 492 U.S. at 131; Wilkinson, 480 U.S. at 926, affg, 800 F.2d 989
(10th Cir. 1986), affg, 611 F. Supp. 1099 (D. 'Utah 1985); Bolger, 463 U.S. at 60; Papish,
410 U.S. at 667; Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26; see also discussion infra part I.C (discussing
First Amendment protection for traditional modes of expression).
26. Cf. Symposium, First Amendment and the Media: Regulating Interactive Commu-
nications on the Information Superhighway, 5 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 235, 284-88 (1995) (commercial on-line services are connected to Internet via gate-
ways); Edward V. Di Lello, Functional Equivalency and Its Application to Freedom of
Speech on Computer Bulletin Boards, 26 COLUM. J.L. &.SOC. PROBS. 199, 205-06 (1993)
(discussing features of commercial on-line services); Sandra Sugawara, Computer Net-
works and the First Amendment; Advanced Technology Raises New Questions and Con-
cerns About an Age-Old Issue, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1991, at A12 (discussing features
of commercial on-line services).
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This Note argues that statutes regulating indecent speech on a
computer network that do not distinguish between the different
methods of communication available on the computer network are
unconstitutional. Part I analogizes functions of the Internet to tra-
ditional methods of communication such as broadcasting, postal
mail, and telephone, and explains the First Amendment protection
available to these more traditional methods of communication. Part
H discusses recent Internet indecency legislation. Part III applies
First Amendment principles to the analogous Internet functions,
showing that the government cannot constitutionally regulate inde-
cent speech on a computer network, except in extremely limited
circumstances. Part III also explores alternative solutions to mini-
mize children's access to sexual materials on the Internet without
impeding adults' First Amendment right to access the materials.
This Note concludes that statutes regulating indecent speech on
the Internet must comply with the Supreme Court's decisions con-
ceming-regulating indecent speech in other media. Consequently,
such statutes are unconstitutional ,unless they specifically address
the Internet's various attributes and consider the limited circum-
stances under which indecent speech can be 'egulated.
I. THE INTERNET AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. The History of the Information Superhighway
The "information superhighway" is "a broadband, multimedia
electronic network through which digitally coded information
(voice, video, text, data, graphics ... ) runs to and from any point
in the network to any other point in the network. 2 7 The Internet
is part of the information superhighway, 28 and grew from an experi-
mental computer network called ARPANET. 29 The U.S. Depart-
27. Richard E. Wiley, Who Will Be the Players on the Information Superhighway?,
in 3 COMM. LAW 1994, at 793, 799 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary
Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 400, 1994).
28. Symposium, supra note 26, at 243.
29. ED KROL, THE WHOLE INTERNET: USER'S GUIDE & CATALOG 13 (2d ed. 1994);
HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING ON THE ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER 67-68 (1993). A computer network links computers together and enables
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ment of Defense's Advanced Research Projects Agency 30
("ARPA") designed ARPANET 31 as part of a military effort to
build a computer network that could function even if part of the
network were destroyed.32 Soon after, many organizations began
building private computer networks called local area networks
("LANs").33 Many of these organizations wanted to connect their
LANs to the ARPANET to allow computer users on different
LANs to communicate with one another.34 Furthering this "inter-
connection" concept, and building on the new networking technolo-
gy, 5 the National Science Foundation36 ("NSF") created NSFNET.37
NSFNET connected universities to each other and linked these
chains of universities to a supercomputer center, which was con-
nected to other supercomputer centers.38 NSFNET subsequently
became the backbone of the Internet.39
The Internet, the world's largest computer network,40 connects
computer users to share information and resources. Anne Meredith Fulton, Cyberspace
and the Internet: Who Will Be the Privacy Police?, 3 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 63, 63 n.5
(1995).
30. RHEINGOLD, supra note 29, at 67.
31. KROL, supra note 29, at 13. In the event of nuclear war, ARPANET would
allow computer users to communicate, even if a bomb eradicated part of the network.
RHEINGOLD, supra note 29, at 74; see KROL, supra note 29, at 13.
ARPANET eliminated the need for a central network communication command
center by using "packet-switching" technology. RHEINGOLD, supra note 29, at 74. "Pack-
et-switching" divides all communications into small data packets, addresses each packet
by source and destination, and labels each packet with information about the other packets
with which it should connect when it reaches its destination. Id. Routers (or "nodes")
along the network read the packet addresses and direct the packets to their respective
destinations. Id. Nodes continuously update one another on packet routing information.
Id. Thus, even if a node is destroyed, another node will ensure that the packet reaches
its destination by rerouting the packet. Id.; see also KROL, supra note 29, at 13.
32. KROL, supra note 29, at 13.
33. Id. at 14. Generally, LANs connect desktop workstations to one another through
a single site-based timesharing computer. Id.
34. Id.
35. RHEINGOLD, supra note 29, at 84.
36. KROL, supra note 29, at 14. The National Science Foundation is an agency of
the U.S. government. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. RHEINGOLD, supra note 29, at 84.
40. KROL, supra note 29, at xix.
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many computer networks including federal networks, regional net-
works, campus networks, and foreign networks.4" Other networks,
such as Fidonet42 and BITNET4 3 are connected to the Internet
through gateways on the information superhighway. 44 In this Note,
the term "Internet" is used, as it is colloquially, to include all inter-
connecting global computer networks existing on the information
superhighway.
B. Comparing Internet Functions with Traditional Modes of
Expression
The Internet represents a unique medium, containing character-
istics of many different traditional methods of communication such
as broadcast, mail, and telephone media.45 With a computer and a
modem, a computer user can access a variety of on-line services
including electronic bulletin board systems, electronic mail servic-
es, and real-time conferencing utilities.4 6
1. Electronic Bulletin Boards
An electronic (or "computer") bulletin board functions like a
computerized message board: anyone may post public messages,
read messages left by others, or hold direct conversations with
individuals.47 Users dial a central computer via modem, and once
their terminals are linked with the bulletin board system they may
communicate with other users and access various information data-
bases.48 Since computerized bulletin board posting allows a user
to reach a vast audience, like broadcasting, this Internet function
41. Id. at 15. An estimated 30 million people use the Internet worldwide. Steve
Lohr, Who Uses Internet? 5.8 Million Are Said to Be Linked in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
27, 1995, at D2. The number of computer users in the U.S. who use the Internet, al-
though difficult to calculate, may be close to 15 million. See id. (suggesting that survey
concluding that size of Internet user population in U.S. is 5.8 million may be inaccurate).
42. Symposium, supra note 26, at 243, 244 n.25.
43. Id. at 243, 244 n.26.
44. Id. at 244.
45. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
46. See Eric C. Jensen, An Electronic Soapbox: Computer Bulletin Boards and the
First Amendment, 39 FED. COMM. L.J. 217, 217-18 (1987).
47. Id. at 217-19.
48. Eric Schlachter, Cyberspace, the Free Market and the Free Marketplace of Ideas:
Recognizing Legal Differences in Computer Bulletin Board Functions, 16 HASTINGS
COMM. & EN'r. L.J. 87, 90 (1993).
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permits "one-to-many" communication. 49 Electronic bulletin board
posting also has many of the attributes of speech in a public set-
ting, such as a park. 0 Additionally, like radio broadcasts, bulletin
board messages enter the privacy of the home.5'
Broadcasting and computerized bulletin boards, however, are
dissimilar in several ways. First, unlike broadcasting, accessing a
bulletin board is substantially more complicated than throwing a
radio switch; 52 anyone accessing a bulletin board system must
maintain a certain level of computer expertise.5
3
Second, when a broadcast listener tunes in to a particular radio
station, he or she is'unaware of the content of the forthcoming
broadcast.5 4 . The listener may be bombarded with offensive or
unwanted aural communications.55 In contrast, the bulletin board
user actively seeks, chooses, and views particular subject areas.56
Thus, unwanted and unsolicited bulletin board messages do not
intrude on the privacy of the home; 57 instead, only invited messages
enter the private realm.
Third, bulletin board systems can maintain warning, screening,
and blocking mechanisms.58 Radio broadcast listeners, however,
may tune in to an offensive broadcast after the radio announcer
49. Id. at 135. "One-to-many" communication involves communication between one
source and many individuals. Cf. id. (distinguishing "one-to-many" communication from
"one-to-one" communication). A commercial bulletin board system may have a gateway
to the Internet, but it is not part of the Internet. Symposium, supra note 26, at 288.
50. See Edward J. Naughton, Is Cyberspace a Public Forum? Computer Bulletin
Boards, Free Speech, and State Action, 81 GEO. L.J. 409, 429 (1992) (describing similari-
ties between computer networks and city streets and parks); see also Michael L. Taviss,
Dueling Forums: The Public Forum Doctrine's Failure to Protect the Electronic Forum,
60 U. CIN. L. REV. 757, 781 (1992) (discussing the public forum doctrine and how differ-
ent types of electronic fora are entitled to different levels of constitutional protection).
51. Jensen, supra note 46, at 238-39. But see infra text accompanying notes 67-72
(drawing analogy between bulletin boards and public fora).
52. See Jensen, supra note 46, at 239.
53. I1d.
54. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
55. See id. at 748-49.
56. Jensen, supra note 46, at 238-39.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Don Oldenburg, Rights on the Line; Defining the Limits on the Net-
works, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1991, at E5 (describing bulletin board system that warns
users when they are about to enter erotic discussion groups).
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gives a warning about the nature of the following broadcast. Thus,
the listener is unaware of the warning and may encounter unwanted
and unexpected communication. Conversely, a bulletin board user
usually receives the warning before he or she chooses to access a
particular bulletin board.59 The user chooses to access the bulletin
board according to its description,60 and consequently,. is protected
from seeing unwanted communication.
Finally, a bulletin board user may employ software filters which
filter objectionable content, or blocking mechanisms which prevent
the user from accessing undesired bulletin boards.6' Similar devic-
es are not available for live radio broadcasts.
However, many of the attributes which make computer bulletin
boards dissimilar to radio broadcast media are those that make
computer bulletin boards similar to cable television media. First,
like the computer bulletin board user, the cable subscriber must
affirmatively contact the cable system to receive cable program-
61
ming. Second, electronic devices allow cable subscribers to pre-
vent reception of unwanted and unauthorized cable programming,63
just as software filters prevent computer users from receiving un-
wanted material.64 Finally, television guides provide viewers with
advance notice of cable program content;65 bulletin boards, like-
wise, often warn of content through bulletin board names and de-
scriptions provided before the computer user accesses the bulletin
board.66
A computer bulletin board is also analogous to a traditional
public forum, such as a park or public sidewalk.67 A public forum
59. See id.; see, e.g., Levy, supra note 9, at 48 (noting that names of picture files
define file content and that computer users do not happen upon offensive material effort-
lessly).
60. See, e.g., Oldenburg, supra note 58.
61. See infra notes 275-81 and accompanying text.
62. Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099, 1113 (D.
Utah 1985), aft'd, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 480 U.S. 926 (1987).
63. id.
64. See infra text accompanying notes 275-81.,
65. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. at 1113.
66. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
67. Naughton, supra note 50, at 430. But see id. at 431 (discussing dissimilarities
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is specifically designed for the communication of ideas and infor-
mation, and is "truly a marketplace of ideas. 68 Similarly, the sole
function of a bulletin board is the communication of information
between numerous computer users.
69
A computer bulletin board operates like a bulletin board in a
town square. 70 For example, a town inhabitant may create a flyer
in the privacy of his home. Once he or she posts the flyer on the
bulletin board, the message is in the public arena. Similarly, com-
puter bulletin board users typically access bulletin boards and post
messages from computers in the privacy of their own homes or
offices. 7'1  However, once a user posts a message, the message
enters the public realm. Thus, computer bulletin board users and
recipients of communication in public settings have similar privacy
interests.72
Critics of the concept of the bulletin board as a traditional pub-
lic forum contend that, unlike city streets and parks, computer
bulletin boards have not been held in trust for the use of the public
between computer bulletin boards and public fora, and noting that public message areas
may be private property subject to subscription agreements between the network operator
and the user).
68. Id. at 430 (quoting Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452
U.S. 640, 658 n.2 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part)). The Communications Decency
Act as originally drafted was criticized because it imposed significant liability on bulletin
board system operators ("sysops"). Susan Moran, On-Line Firms Freed from Big Brother
Role in Obscenity Bill, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 27, 1995, at 41. Recent changes to the bill
have eliminated sysop liability for computer users' transmissions. Id.
69. See Naughton, supra note 50, at 430 (noting that unlike sidewalks, streets and
parks, computer networks were specifically created for purpose of communication).
70. See id. at 413 (stating that computerized public message areas resemble tradition-
al bulletin boards and public fora).
71. Cf. Peter H. Lewis, Report of High Internet Use Is Challenged, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
13, 1995, at D5 (stating that report that 24 million Americans and Canadians use the
Internet may be inaccurate because people with lower incomes who were less likely to
use personal computers at home or work were underrepresented in survey).
72. See Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) ("we
are often 'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable
speech"); cf. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975) (holding that
persons on public streets have limited privacy interests that do not justify banning all nude
films visible from those streets); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971) (stating
that a person's privacy interest in a courthouse corridor or public park is significantly less
than an individual's privacy interest in his or her home).
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for purposes of assembly and discussing public questions.73 This
is because computer bulletin boards are recent technological devel-
opments, and thus, have not attained traditional public forum sta-
tus.74  Yet this analysis fails to consider that evolving traditions
may require courts to adapt precedents from the physical environ-
ment and apply them to the electronic environment.75 Also, while
city streets and parks serve other important societal functions in
addition to providing fora for communication, the computer bulletin
board's only function is the communication of ideas and informa-
tion.76 Thus, the bulletin board may require a higher level of First
Amendment protection.77
2. Electronic Mail Systems
An electronic mail system functions differently from a bulletin
board system, since electronic mail does not have the same mes-
sage posting features of a bulletin board system. Instead, electronic
mail operates like a postal system: the sender transmits a message
to another individual's electronic mailing address via central com-
puter.78
73. Naughton, supra note 50, at 431 (emphasizing that the traditional use of the
medium determines its forum status).
74. Id.
75. David Gordon, Taking the First Amendment on the Road: A Rationale for Broad
Protection for Freedom of Expression on the Information Superhighway, 3 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 135, 138 (1995).
76. See id. at 140 (arguing that public forum status should be determined by medi-
um's communication function rather than physical attributes). A First Amendment analy-
sis should focus on the communication function of a medium rather than the physical
characteristics of the medium in order to preserve the fundamental freedom of speech.
See id.; Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information
Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1062, 1077 (1994) (stating that debate about communi-
cation technology regulation focuses too much on comparison of technologies rather than
how First Amendment values are best served); see also David J. Goldstone, The Public
Forum Doctrine in the Age of the Information Superhighway (Where Are the Public
Forums on the Information Superhighway?), 46 HASTINGS L.J. 335, 383 (1995) (listing
characteristics defining public fora on computer network).
77. See Naughton, supra note 50, at 429-31 (discussing importance of communication
medium's principal or sole purpose as communication of ideas in determining whether
that medium should receive higher level of constitutional protection as public forum).
78. Lynn Becker, Electronic Publishing: First Amendment Issues in the Twenty-First
Century, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 801, 805 n.14 (1985). Some bulletin boards have elec-
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Electronic mail does not permit simultaneous conversation. The
sender transmits a message to the recipient's address and the mes-
sage remains in the recipient's electronic mailbox until the recipient
logs on the network, reads it, and deletes it. 79 In this respect, elec-
tronic mail is similar to postal mail.
3. Real-Time Conferencing
Real-time conferencing is another method of communicating on
the Internet. This method allows users to simultaneously communi-
cate with one another by typing messages back and forth in real
time.80 Thus, real-time conferencing has characteristics of both
telephone and postal mail communication.
Although real-time conferencing allows users to have concur-
rent conversations like the telephone, real-time conferencing is not
as intrusive as telephone communication for several reasons. First,
when a telephone rings, the call recipient's quietude is immediately
interrupted by the sound of the ring. When using a real-time
conferencing utility, the message recipient must already be on-line
to get a message on his or her machine that another on-line user
wants to converse. The message the real-time call recipient re-
ceives is usually a visual message, and not the invasive ring of a
telephone.
Second, the telephone is a highly confrontational medium. 81
Before answering the telephone, the recipient is unaware of the
caller's identity.8 2 The recipient is then confronted, not only by the
statements of the caller, but by the voice and person of the caller.83
In contrast, when using the real-time conferencing function, the
recipient must answer a sender's "chat request" to converse with
tronic mail capabilities which allow the user to send private electronic mail messages
and/or post messages while accessing a bulletin board system. Schlachter, supra note 48,
at 107.
79. Naughton, supra note 50, at 418-19.
80. See Schlachter, supra note 48, at 141. This function is also called "chatting."
RHEINGOLD, supra note 29, at 108.
81. See M. Sean Royall, Constitutionally Regulating Telephone Harassment. An
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the sender;8" therefore, the recipient is either aware of the sender's
identity or voluntarily chooses to chat with an anonymous sender."
Also, since the sender and recipient do not hear or verbally speak
with each other, the recipient is not confronted with the sender's
voice, tone, inflection, or person. 86 Thus, real-time conferencing
does not invade the recipient's sphere of privacy like a telephone
call.
Real-time conferencing also bears some similarities to pOstal
mail. While telephone calls are extremely personal invasions, the
unwilling recipient of mail is "violated" only by the content of the
message.87 The mail recipient receives a written communication in
his or her mailbox, while the real-time conferencer receives a writ-
ten communication on his or her screen.
However, real-time conferencing is more intrusive than physical
mail because of the immediacy of its delivery. The time period
between writing a physical mail message and its ultimate delivery
is significantly longer than the immediate delivery of a real-time
conferencing message.88 Obviously, the post office cannot deliver
mail as quickly as the virtually simultaneous communications occur
on a real-time conferencing utility. The real-ime conferencer is
more quickly confronted with messages than a mail recipient, and
thus may feel that the sender is looming closer to home. 89  Al-
though a real-time conferencing recipient is not confronted with the
84. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 29, at 179.
85. Even if the sender communicates anonymously, the recipient has the option of
not "answering" the sender's request to conference. Since the real-time conferencing
medium does not have the incessant and annoying ring of the telephone, persistent real-
time calls are not as intrusive as persistent telephone calls. Cf. Royall, supra note 81, at
1417 n.63 (likening harassing telephone calls to actual trespasses because ringing tele-
phone "beckons to be answered" and caller's identity is usually unknown before telephone
is answered).
86. Cf. id. at 1416-17 nn.62-63 (discussing confrontational nature of telephone call).
87. Id. at 1416 n.62.
88. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 29, at 79. Internet communication lines can transmit
information at forty-five million bits per second. Id. At this speed, an Internet user can
send five thousand pages per second. Id.
89. Cf. Royall, supra note 81, at 1416-17 n.62 (discussing importance of caller's
sensory confrontation with call recipient, in addition to content of caller's statements, in
determining level of invasion of recipient's privacy).
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sender's voice, tone, inflection, or person like a telephone call
recipient, 9° the real-time conferencing recipient encounters the send-
er more personally than a mail recipient: the recipient is immedi-
ately aware of the sender's presence as the sender's message is
being communicated.9'
Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, real-time
conferencing falls between telephone communication and postal
mail communication on the invasion of privacy spectrum.
Future communications media will most likely combine features
of bulletin board systems, electronic mail, real-time conferencing,
aural communication and visual images. 92 Additionally, these me-
dia will be highly interactive93 and will not be analogous to any
one traditional method of communication. 94 They will also com-
bine many of the most intrusive aspects of the traditional methods
of communication.95 Someday, pressing one button may connect
a listener to a face, a voice, and unwanted communication without
warning.96 Alternatively, the media's interactivity may give users
90. See Royall, supra note 81, at 1416-17 nn.62-63.
91. See supra note 88 (discussing speed of real-time conferencing communication).
92. See Jerry Berman & Daniel J. Weitzner, Abundance and User Control: Renewing
the Democratic Heart of the First Amendment in the Age of Interactive Media, 104 YALE
L.J. 1619, 1619 n.1 (1995). Features of the future media will include "the convergence
of traditionally distinct media-such as television, telephones, and computer net-
works-into overlapping or common modes of communication." Id.
93. Id. Non-interactive media, or passive media, do not allow users to engage in
dialogue. PATRICK M. GARRY, SCRAMBLING FOR PROTECTION: THE NEW MEDIA AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 48 (1994) (passive media are systems for one-way communica-
tion). The passive medium user can receive communication but cannot communicate with
the source through the passive medium. See id. For example, television is a passive
medium. Id.
Interactive media allow two-way communication. Id. An interactive medium gives
more control to the user than a passive medium by permitting the user to choose the
information he or she receives, rather than forcing the user to absorb the information the
sender chooses to send. Id. at 50.
94. See GARRY, supra note 93, at 49 ("a new personal computer will merge various
forms of technologies like the computer, television, and videodisc into one interactive
multimedia system"). Single technological systems are merging previously distinct meth-
ods of communication. id. at 148. Thus, a one-to-one relationship no longer exists
between a medium and its use. Id.
95. See id. at 49 ("the emergence of interactive multimedia will bring together--on
a screen in people's living rooms-information, music, voices, photographs, and video").
96. See id.
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the ability to exercise complete control over the information and
images they access.97
C. First Amendment Protection for Traditional Modes of
Expression
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech ....98 Consequently,
serious First Amendment concerns arise when the U.S. government
attempts to regulate speech, regardless of the vehicle of expres-
sion.99
The Supreme Court, however, has held that freedom of speech
is not an absolute right.1m° Under the First Amendment, both the
content and context of speech are critical elements.1"' Thus, the
government can constitutionally prohibit speech that creates a
"clear and present danger,"10 2 or is designated as low value
speech. 103 Low value speech includes "the lewd and obscene, the
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words-those
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace. ' ' 1° This speech is "unprotected" by
the First Amendment.10
5
Where speech does not fall within one of the unprotected cate-
97. Berman & Weitzner, supra note 92, at 1632; see supra note 93 (discussing
interactive media).
98. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
99. See, e.g., Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989)
(indecent telephone messages); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (picketing before
or about individual's dwelling); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (indecent
broadcast monologue); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (picketing in shopping
center); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (showing films containing
nudity visible from public street); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)
(making noise while on grounds adjacent to school while classes are in session); Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (wearing jacket bearing expletive in courthouse).
100. ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 62 (1983); see, e.g.,
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (fighting words).
101. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 744.
102. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
103. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
104. Id.
105. See id. Additionally, the First Amendment protects non-commercial speech
more than commercial speech. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64-65
(1983).
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gories, the speech is "protected" by the First Amendment; it is
presumptively constitutional, and the government may not regulate
it absent a compelling state interest.l°6 Many statutes limiting pro-
tected speech are designed to protect "unwilling listeners"-those
persons who do not wish to hear, see or otherwise be disturbed by
a communication. 107
Therefore, to maintain the delicate balance between the right of
one individual to communicate and the right of another individual
to be left alone, the Supreme Court has created a two-part standard:
"[t]he ability of government ...to shut off discourse solely to
protect others from hearing it is... dependent upon a showing that
substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially
intolerable manner."1 °8 The substantiality of an individual's priva-
cy interest is determined by the forum in which the communication
is received. 0 9 An individual's privacy interest is greatest in the
home," o and least in a highly public place."'
The intolerability of the invasive speech is determined by the
type and nature of the communication." 2 A communication is least
intolerable when one can easily avoid the communication, and most
intolerable when one cannot escape the communication." 3 Visual
106. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 126; POOL, supra note 100, at 59-74.
107. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (ordinance prohibiting use of
sound amplifier which emits loud and raucous noises held constitutional); Martin v. City
of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (ordinance prohibiting person distributing advertise-
ments door-to-door from knocking on door, ringing doorbell or otherwise summoning
inhabitant to door held unconstitutional); Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932)
(statute prohibiting tobacco advertisements by billboard or placard challenged under
Fourteenth Amendment).
108. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21 (emphasis added).
109. See Mark S. Nadel, Rings of Privacy: Unsolicited Telephone Calls and the Right
of Privacy, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 99, 101 (1986).
110. See Royall, supra note 81, at 1419.
111. See Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 209 (restrictions on protected speech "have been
upheld only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home ... or the degree of
captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure");
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21-22.
112. See Nadel, supra note 109, at 101.
113. See id. In Cohen v. California, the defendant wore a jacket bearing the words
"Fuck the Draft" in a courthouse. 403 U.S. at 16. He was convicted under a statute
which proscribed maliciously and willfully disturbing the peace or quiet of any neighbor-
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communication, such as publicly displayed messages and mail, are
easily avoided. 1 4  Alternatively, the blaring of a sound truck or
other aural communication are significantly more intrusive."'
Phone calls are particularly intrusive, since the caller directly con-
fronts the recipient and compels a reaction. 1 6 The -time of day at
which the communication occurs can also affect the level of
intolerability of the invasion."1 7
'Respect for an individual's decision to reject communications
directed at that individual is fundamental to a person's right to
privacy in the home."18 Accordingly, limitations on the dissemina-
tion of messages to both willing and unwilling recipients are much
more difficult to justify than restrictions which give unwilling re-
cipients the right to reject unwanted communications and maintain
willing recipients' right to receive the same communications.' 9
hood or person by offensive conduct. id. at 16, 16 n. 1. The Supreme Court reversed the
conviction, holding that the privacy interest in the courthouse could not be intolerably
invaded where unwilling listeners "could effectively avoid further bombardment of their
sensibilities simply by averting their eyes." id. at 21.
In subsequent cases, the phrase "avert one's eyes" was broadly construed to mean
"avoid receiving the communication." See Sable, 492 U.S. at 127-28 (holding that where
caller actively seeks communication by dialing telephone number, message received by
caller is "not so invasive or surprising that it prevents an unwilling listener from avoiding
exposure to it"); Bolger, 463 U.S. at 74 (receipt of mail is less intrusive and uncontrolla-
ble compared with. hearing indecent radio broadcast); cf. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49
(broadcasting is confrontational medium). Therefore, where the recipient has an accept-
able burden of avoiding the communication, the government cannot prohibit speech as
invading "in an essentially intolerable manner." See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 72 (recipient of
objectionable mailings bears acceptable burden of making "the 'short, though regular,
journey from mail box to trash can' (quoting Lamont v. Comm'r of Motor Vehicles, 269
F. Supp. 880, 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 386 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391
U.S. 915 (1968))).
114. See Nadel, supra note 109, at 102-03.
115. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Nadel, supra note 109, at 103.
116. See Royall, supra note 81, at 1416-17 nn.62-63 (discussing intrusive aspects of
telephone calls).
117. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 121; Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 729.
118. Alan E. Brownstein, Hate Speech and Harassment: The Constitutionality of
Campus Codes that Prohibit Racial Insults, 3 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 179, 188
(1994).
119. See Nadel, supra note 109, at 104-05. Compare Bolger, 463 U.S. 60 (holding
that government could not place absolute ban on mailing of contraceptive advertising)
with Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (holding that govern-
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Therefore, where the intolerability of the invasion and the substan-
tiality of the privacy interest are not at their peak levels, the gov-
ernment must allow the sender to communicate. 20 The government
may protect an unwilling recipient of a communication by giving
the recipient the right to reject further unwanted communication
from that sender.' 2' If the sender continues to communicate to the
recipient after receiving notice of the recipient's wish to receive no
further communication from that sender, the invasive communica-
tion may become intolerable. 22 However, in order for the sender
to suffer criminal sanctions, the recipient's burden of avoiding the
continued communication must outweigh the sender's right to com-
municate his or her message.
2 3
In Rowan v. United States Post Office Department,124 the Su-
preme Court accorded discretion to reject unwanted communica-
tions to postal mail recipients. Rowan involved a federal statute
125
that instructed the Postmaster General, upon receipt of notice from
an addressee, stating that the addressee had received material that
he or she found to be erotically arousing or sexually provocative,
to direct the sender to refrain from mailing to that addressee.
26
ment could grant unwilling recipient's request that Postmaster General order cessation of
mailing from particular sender).
120. Compare Sable, 492 U.S. at 128 (holding that since dial-in communication is
initiated by affirmative act of listener, the level of invasion is not so intolerable as to
justify governmental restriction) with Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748 (holding that since broad-
casting is uniquely pervasive and uniquely accessible to children, government may prohib-
it broadcasting indecent speech).
121. Compare Bolger, 463 U.S. at 60 (holding statute unconstitutional which permits
Postal Service to dispose of contraceptive advertisements without notifying sender and
without authorization from addressee) with Rowan, 397 U.S. at 728 (holding statute
constitutional which permits addressee to direct Postmaster General to direct sender of
advertisements to stop mailing to that addressee).
122. See Rowan, 397 U.S. at 738.
123. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21. The sender's right to communicate is sufficiently
protected by these provisions. See Rowan, 397 U.S. at 738. The notice from the unwill-
ing listener to the sender must be so clear and unambiguous that the sender is presumed
to know that the recipient wishes no further communication from the sender. See id.
(specific notice from Postmaster General).
124. 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970).
125. Id. at 729-30.
126. Id. at 730.
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Congress enacted the statute in response to public and congressio-
nal concern with the use of mail facilities to distribute offensive
advertisements. 27 The legislature's objective was to protect minors
and the privacy of homes from offensive material and to place
discretion in the hands of the addressee. 128 The Court upheld the
statute's constitutionality, recognizing the importance of according
householders the right to decide what should enter the home 29 and
noting that the mailer's right to communicate remains protected
since it "is circumscribed only by an affirmative act of the address-
ee giving notice that he wishes no further mailings from that mail-
er.' 30 In addition to expressly providing clear notice to the mailer
of the specific communication to be proscribed, the statute also
provided a definitive description of the consequences resulting from
an alleged violation of the Postmaster General's order.1 3' Thus, the
sender's right to communicate was significantly protected since the
mailer had to receive an extremely clear warning before the gov-
ernment could prohibit continued communication. 32
Subsequently, in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corpora-
tion,1 33 the Court reinforced Rowan's holding. Bolger considered
a federal statute which allowed the Postal Service to discard contra-
ceptive advertisements before they reached the addressee and with-
out consent from the addressee. 134 The Court stressed the impor-
tance of giving the recipient of a potentially offensive advertise-
ment the right to refuse the mailing. 35 Since the statute did not
provide the recipient with the opportunity to both review the mail-
127. Id. at 731.
128. id. at 732.
129. Id. at 737 ("what may not be provocative to one person may well be to anoth-
er").
130. Id.
131. id. at 738-39. If the Postmaster General had reason to believe that a sender had
violated his order, the statute authorized him to notify the sender of his belief, and grant
the sender the opportunity to respond and a hearing. Id. at 730. After the hearing, if the
Postmaster General determined that his order was violated, he could seek a court order
directing the sender to comply with his order. Id.
132. See id. at 738.
133. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
134. Id. at 61.
135. Id. at 72.
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ing and unilaterally decide whether he or she would like to receive
future mailings from the sender, the Court held the statute unconsti-
tutional. 13
6
I Thus, in both Rowan and Bolger, the Court identified a specific
speech limitation standard: government may limit protected speech
where a communication continues to invade a substantial privacy
interest after the sender receives clear and unambiguous notice of
the specific communication that the listener does not want to re-
ceive, and the recipient's burden of avoiding the communication is
unacceptable. 137
Since indecent speech is protected under the First Amend-
ment, 38 the Court applies the speech limitation standard defined in
Rowan and Bolger when determining the constitutionality of a
statute prohibiting indecent speech. For example, in Sable Commu-
nications of California v. FCC,139 the Supreme Court addressed the
constitutionality of section 223(b) of the Federal Communications
Act of 1934.140 This statute prohibited indecent and obscene inter-
state commercial telephone messages,' 4' and was designed to re-
136. Id.
137. See id. at 60; Rowan, 397 U.S. at 728.
138. Sable, 492 U.S. at 126. Indecent speech is that which "describes [or depicts],
in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards ... sexual
or excretory activities and organs." in re Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1975).
139. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
140. 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (current version at 47 U.S.C. §
223(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); see also Roe v. Meese, 689 F. Supp. 344, 346-47
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (addressing constitutionality of Telephone Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. §
223(b)). 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) is subject to amendment by the Communications Decency
Act. S. 314, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
141. 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (current version at 47 U.S.C. §
223(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). At the time that Sable commenced the action, the
statute criminally penalized "Whoever knowingly-(A) in the District of Columbia or in
interstate or foreign communication, by means of telephone, makes (directly or by record-
ing device) any obscene or indecent communication for commercial purposes to any
person, regardless of whether the maker of such communication placed the call.....
Sable, 492 U.S. at 123 n.4 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987)). Before
the Supreme Court rendered its decision, 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) was amended to place the
prohibition of obscene commercial telephone messages in a separate subsection from that
criminalizing indecent commercial telephone messages. Id. at 123 n.5 (discussing 47
U.S.C. § 223(b) (1988)). This amendment, however, did not affect the substantive prohi-
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strict the access of minors to "dial-a-porn" services. 4 2  In Sable,
the Court permitted the ban on obscene commercial telephone mes-
sages, 143 but held the portion of the statute prohibiting indecent
commercial telephone messages unconstitutional.'44 Since indecent
sexual expression is protected speech,145 the Court determined that
it could allow the government to regulate protected speech to pro-
mote a compelling interest, as long as the government chose the
least restrictive means to further that interest.146 The Court recog-
nized the government's significant interest in protecting minors
from speech that, although not obscene, may have a harmful influ-
ence. 147 However, the Court stated that "the government may not
'reduce the adult population ... to ... [hearing] only what is fit
for children."' 148  According to the Court, a total ban on indecent
bitions of the statute and, thus, the Court proceeded to decide the statute's constitutional-
ity. Id.
142. Sable, 492 U.S. at 120. A "dial-a-pom" service offers prerecorded pornographic
telephone messages through a telephone network. Id. at 117-18. Callers dial a special
adult message number and are charged a special fee. Id. at 118. The fee collected is
shared between the message provider and the telephone network. Id.
143. Id. at 124.
144. Id. at 131. Sable, a dial-a-porn service, argued that the legislation created an
impermissible national standard of obscenity, contravening the "contemporary community
standards" requirement of Miller v. California. Id. at 124 (discussing 47 U.S.C. § 223(b)
(1982 & Supp. V 1987) (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993))
and Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)). The Miller Court set forth three basic
guidelines for the trier of fact to consider in determining whether published material is
obscene and therefore not protected by the First Amendment:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community
standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (citations omitted) (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by. the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken
as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. Obscene speech is not protected under the First Amendment. Id.
at 23.
The Sable Court concluded that even if Sable's audience was comprised of different
communities with different local standards, Sable, the sender of the communications,
should bear the burden of complying with the government's prohibition. Sable, 492 U.S.
at 126.
145. Sable, 492 U.S. at 126.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 126-27.
148. Id. at 128 (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73
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commercial telephone messages was not narrowly tailored to meet
the government's legitimate objective of protecting minors, since
the ban denied adults access to these messages.149 Indeed, the FCC
had conducted extensive hearings and determined that credit card,
access code, and scrambling rules were satisfactory deterrents to
minors' access to dial-a-porn messages; 50 thus, the government
could achieve their legitimate objective through these less restric-
tive means.' 5' The Court further found that the recipient's burden
of avoiding the communication was acceptable because the recipi-
ent of the communication could not receive the communication
without soliciting the communication himself.5 2  Therefore, the
government could not limit the protected speech under the Court's
speech limitation standard, 153 and the statute was held to be uncon-
stitutional as applied to indecent commercial telephone messages.'54
The Supreme Court has also held that indecent radio broadcasts
do not receive the same level of First Amendment protection as
indecent telephone messages.'55 In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,156
the Court justified its special treatment of indecent broadcasting by
focusing on one of broadcasting's unique characteristics: the ease
with which children can access the broadcast medium. 57 The Paci-
(1983)).
149. Id. at 131.
150. Id. at 128.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 127-28.
153. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 60; Rowan, 397 U.S. at 728; see also supra text accom-
panying note 137 (discussing speech limitation standard).
154. Sable, 492 U.S. at 131.
155. Compare id. (explaining why broadcast speech receives limited First Amend-
ment protection) with Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-50 (holding that absolute ban on indecent
telephone messages is unconstitutional).
156. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
157. Id. at 750. The FCC had previously identified four reasons why broadcasting
requires special treatment:
(1) [C]hildren have access to radios and in many cases are unsupervised by
parents; (2) radio receivers are in the home, a place where people's privacy
interest is entitled to extra deference (citation omitted); (3) unconsenting adults
may tune in a station without any warning that offensive language is being or
will be broadcast; and (4) there is a scarcity of spectrum space, the use of
which the government must therefore license in the public interest.
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fica Foundation owned a New York radio station which broadcast-
ed comedian George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue at 2
o'clock in the afternoon. 58  The Court drew a sharp distinction
between this indecent broadcast and the situation in Cohen v. Cali-
fornia.15 9 In Cohen, Paul Cohen wore the slogan "Fuck the Draft"
on the back of his jacket in a courthouse. The Pacifica Court not-
ed that though Cohen's message may have been incomprehensible
to a young child, Pacifica's broadcast could be easily mimicked. 6 °
While stressing the narrowness of its holding, the Court described
the following factors relevant to its constitutionality determination:
broadcasting's unique medium; the time of day of the broadcast;
the content of the program in which the language was used; and
differences among various broadcast media, such as radio, televi-
sion, and closed-circuit transmissions. 161 The Court recognized the
government's significant interest in protecting its youth and in
supporting parents' authority in their own home. 162 Consequently,
by applying the speech limitation standard, the Court identified
indecent broadcasting as invading the highest level of privacy inter-
est at the highest level of intolerability.1 63 The Pacifica Court thus,
constitutionally limited the speech without first allowing the sender
Id. at 731 n.2 (quoting In re Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 97 (1975)).
158. Id. at 729-30. The "Filthy Words" monologue included, according to the
monologue itself, the "words you couldn't say on the public ... airwaves .... the ones
you definitely wouldn't say, ever .... The original seven words were shit, piss, fuck,
cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits." Id. at 751 (appendix to opinion of the court).
It should be noted that similar language has been constitutionally protected in other
contexts. See, e.g., Papish v. Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667 (1973)
(holding that First Amendment protected university newspaper headline story entitled
"Motherf- Acquitted"); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that First
Amendment protected "Fuck the Draft" slogan worn on jacket in courthouse).
159. 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971); see supra note 113.
160. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749.
161. Id. at 748-50.
162. Id. at 749-50.
163. Cf. supra text accompanying note 120 (discussing balancing test Court must
apply before allowing or prohibiting communication).
The Supreme Court also recently rejected a constitutional challenge to a federal
statute which bans indecent programming on radio and broadcast television during the day
and in prime-time hours. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Allow Limits on Indecent Radio and
TV Shows, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 9, 1996, at 25.
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to communicate.16
Subsequently, in Community Television of Utah, Inc. v.
Wilkinson, 165 the court distinguished cable from broadcast media.
Community Television involved the Utah Cable Television Decency
Act which provided that officials could bring nuisance actions
against anyone who "continuously and 'knowingly distributes inde-
cent material. .. over any cable -television system."",166 The district
court held that the Pacifica rationale did not apply to the cable
medium since, unlike radio broadcasts, a cable television subscriber
acts affirmatively to specifically invite the cable medium into the
home 67 and adequate blocking devices exist to prevent reception
of any cable programming that the subscriber has not authorized. 168
The court, quoting language from the FCC's amicus curiae brief,
noted that: (1) cable service requires the viewer to affirmatively
contact a cable company and request a subscription; 69 (2) a sub-
scriber must pay a premium to receive certain channels; 70 (3) a
cable subscriber may block cable programming through a "lock
box;"'171 and, (4) television guides provide advance notice of the
nature and content of programs. 72  The court' also noted that a
strong parental interest in supervising children existed. 173
164. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-50.
165. 611 F. Supp. 1099, 1112-14 (D. Utah 1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir.
1986), aff'd, 480 U.S. 926 (1987).
166. Id. at 1100 (citation omitted).
167. Id. at 1113.
168. id. "[C]able TV is not an intruder but an invitee whose invitation can be
carefully circumscribed." Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. Without payment, the cable signal is scrambled so that the viewer cannot
receive either visual or aural cable communication. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1115. Recently, the Supreme Court has agreed to review the constitution-
ality of certain indecent cable programming restrictions. Linda Greenhouse, Justices to
Rule on Limiting Cable TV's Sexually Explicit Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1995, at
A20. In Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted,
116 S. Ct. 471 (1995), the court of appeals upheld the constitutionality of FCC regulations
which give cable operators discretion to ban indecent programming. Id. at 125. The
regulations provide that if the cable operator does not regulate indecent programming on
its leased-access channels, the operator must segregate the indecent programming on a
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Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that visual communica-
tion in a public environment is not subject to the same restrictions
as radio broadcasts. In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,"74 the
Court considered a city ordinance which prohibited a drive-in mov-
ie theater from showing films containing nudity when the movie
screen is visible from a public street or place. 175 ,The limited priva-
cy interests of persons on public streets did not justify censorship
of protected speech on the basis of content.176 Instead, the Court
held that the burden of avoiding the speech fell upon the offended
viewer who could readily avert his or her eyes. 177  The govern-
ment's interest in prohibiting youths from viewing the films, there-
fore, was insufficient to necessitate such a broad prohibition on all
nudity to all members of the community. T17  Speech that was not
obscene as to youths nor otherwise legitimately proscribed could
not be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images
that the government deemed unsuitable for them. 179 Applying its
speech limitation standard, the Court concluded that individuals on
public streets did not have substantial privacy interests and could
easily avoid further communication. 80
Thus, in Sable, Rowan, Bolger,, Pacifica,: Erznoznik, and
single channel and only provide such programming to cable subscribers who specifically
request access to it. Id. at 112. The court determined that granting cable operators
editorial authority to ban indecent programming on their systems did not constitute state
action, and thus, did not violate the First Amendment. Id. at 113-21. Also, the court held
that since the regulations simply shift the burden of making a request to the cable compa-
ny from the viewers who do not want indecent programming to the viewers who want
indecent programming, the regulations are constitutional. Id. at 127. Civil liberties
groups argue that the Communications Decency Act is unconstitutional under the Alliance
decision. See Memorandum from Jill Lesser, People for the American Way Action Fund
and Danny Weitzner, Center for Democracy & Technology (June 7, 1995) (available at
http://www.cdt.orgcda.html) (on file with the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media &
Entertainment Law Journal).
174. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
175. Id. at 206-07.
176. Id. at 212.
•177. Id.
178. Id. at 213.
179. Id. at 213-14.
180. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 60; Rowan, 397 U.S. at 728; see also supra text accom-
panying note 137 (discussing speech limitation standard).
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through the Court's affirmance of Wilkinson, the Court consistently
applied the speech limitation standard and drew the following con-
clusions: (1) indecent broadcasting can be constitutionally limited;
(2) indecent commercial telephone messages cannot be constitution-
ally banned; (3) unsolicited sexually oriented advertisements can be
mailed where the recipient has the right to reject the mailings; (4)
films containing nudity may be shown at a drive-in theater that is
visible from a public street; and (5) indecent cable broadcasts must
receive more constitutional protection than indecent radio broad-
casts.
II. PROPOSED LEGISLATION CONCERNING INDECENT SPEECH ON
THE INTERNET
During 1995, several bills were introduced to Congress which
would affect the transmission of indecent speech via the Internet.' 8'
Both houses passed Internet regulation legislation, 8 2 but each
house's approach to the issue of indecent speech regulation signifi-
cantly differed.1 83 While the Senate measure would penalize those
who transmit indecent speech, 84 the House bill would preserve the
Internet's present status, free from government regulation. 185
Although the exact language of the proposed Internet regulation
statute has not yet been finalized, it is expected that the proposed
statute will contain language prohibiting indecent speech on the
Internet. 186 Indeed, House telecommunications conferees voted nar-
181. See supra note 8.
182. See infra notes 197, 231 and accompanying text.
183. See Edmund L. Andrews, Accord Reached for Limiting Smut on the Internet,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1995, at A9 (discussing compromises needed to conform House and
Senate bills); Telecom Bill Conference Opens with Hope for Quick Ending, COMM. DAILY,
Oct. 25, 1995 (stating that Senate measure harshly penalizes service providers while
House legislation makes computer users responsible).
184. See infra part II.A.
185. See infra part II.D. As of this writing, Congress has not yet voted on a final
measure, but a joint conference committee composed of representatives from both the
House and the Senate have convened to compromise on the specific provisions of an
Internet regulation statute. See Edmund L. Andrews, For Telecommunications Bill, Time
for Some Horse Trading, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1995, at D1, D10.
186. See Edmund L. Andrews, Bill Would Curb On-Line Obscenity, N.Y. TIMES,
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rowly for a provision that would make computer users liable for
providing indecent material to children,18 7 but would protect on-line
service providers whose customers use them to transmit sexually
explicit material.188
The following is a brief description of the Internet indecency
bills introduced throughout 1995.89
A. The Communications Decency Act of 1995
On February 1, 1995, Senator Exon of Nebraska, introduced the
Communications Decency Act to the U.S. Senate.' 90 The Commu-
nications Decency Act, as originally drafted, would have amended
the section of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 which
prohibits obscene or harassing telephone calls, 19' imposing criminal
Dec. 7, 1995, at Al, B12. In a parallel development, an on-line service recently deleted
the word "breast" from member profiles in accordance with its own rules prohibiting
"obscene or vulgar" language. Amy Harmon, On-Line Service Draws Protest in Censor
Flap, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1995, at 1. The on-line service later reversed its decision in
response to protests by breast cancer survivors who use the service to share information
about breast cancer. Id.
187. See Albert R. Karr, House Conferees Adopt Measure to Ban 'Indecent' On-Line
Material for Children, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 1995, at A16. Rep. Henry Hyde strongly
advocated the indecency provisions in the proposed legislation. Daniel Pearl, Compromise
Sought on Curbs for Internet, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 1995, at B8. Rep. Hyde is the spon-
sor of amendments to federal obscenity laws recently passed by the House which could
criminalize some forms of on-line speech. John Schwartz, House Vote Bars Internet
Censorship, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1995, at All. The Christian Coalition backs Rep.
Hyde, ardently supporting prohibitions on indecent material on the Internet. Pearl, supra;
see also Letter from Edwin Meese III, Ralph Reed, Christian Coalition, et al., to Honor-
able Thomas L. Bliley, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Commerce, United States House of
Representatives and Hon. Larry Pressler, Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science
and Transportation, United States Senate (Oct. 16, 1995) (available at
http://www.cdt.org/cda.html) (on file with the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media &
Entertainment Law Journal).
188. See Hiawatha Gray, A Measure of Relief, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 8, 1995, at 63.
A vote on the compromise measure is expected as part of a telecommunications legisla-
tion overhaul. See Daniel Pearl, House GOP Stalls Rewrite of Phone Law, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 22, 1995, at A2, A4; Edmund L. Andrews, Overhaul Backed in Communication,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1995, at Al, D5.
189. The final legislation will probably be drawn from language in these proposals.
See, e.g., Pearl, supra note 187 (describing proposed Internet indecency legislation lan-
guage to be discussed during conference committee negotiations).
190. S. 314, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
191. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (1988). The relevant portion of the Federal Communications
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penalties for obscene or harassing use of any telecommunications
facilities 192 and criminally punishing those who create and send
indecent speech over the Internet.193
The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transporta-
tion passed the amendment in a vote on March 23, 1995,194 as part
Act of 1934 reads as follows:
§ 223. Obscene or harassing telephone calls in the District of Columbia or in
interstate or foreign communications
(a) Whoever-
(1) in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign commu-
nication by means of telephone-
(A) makes any comment, request, suggestion or proposal
which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent;
(B) makes a telephone call, whether or not conversation
ensues, without disclosing his identity and with intent to
annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person at the called
number;
(C) makes or causes the telephone of another repeatedly or
continuously to ring, with intent to harass any person at the
called number; or
(D) makes repeated telephone calls, during which conversa-
tion ensues, solely to harass any person at the called num-
ber; or
(2) knowingly permits any telephone facility under his control to
be used for any purpose prohibited by this section,
shall be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned not more than six months,
or both.
Id.
192. S. 314, supra note 190.
193. Id. § 2(a)(l).
194. S. REP. No. 23, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 14, 59-60 (1995). Part of the amend-
ment, passed on March 23, 1995, reads as follows:
SEC. 223. OBSCENE OR HARASSING UTILIZATION OF TELECOM-
MUNICATIONS DEVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE DIS-
TRICT OF COLUMBIA OR IN INTERSTATE OR FOR-
EIGN COMMUNICATIONS.
(a) Whoever-
(1) in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communica-
tion by means of ... telecommunications device- .
(A) knowingly- ,
(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of, any comment, request, sug-
gestion, proposal, image or other communication which is ob-
scene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent;
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of an overall telecommunications reform package.1 95  When the
amendment was presented to the Senate on June 14, 1995, the
language of the section punishing persons initiating the transmis-
sion of indecent speech was modified to only penalize persons who
initiate the indecent speech "with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten
or harass another person." 196 The Senate passed the measure by a
vote of 84-16.'9'
The Communications Decency Act is aimed at curing misuse
of the information superhighway. 98  Senator Exon wants young
(B) makes a telephone call or utilizes a telecommunications de-
vice, whether or not conversation or communication ensues, without
disclosing his identity and with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or
harass any person at the called number or who receives the communi-
cation;
(C) makes or causes the telephone of another repeatedly or con-
tinuously to ring, with intent to harass any person at the called num-
ber; or ...
(D) makes repeated telephone calls or repeatedly initiates com-
munication with a telecommunications device, during which conversa-
tion or communication ensues, solely to harass any person at the
called number or who receives the communication; or
(2) knowingly permits any ... telecommunications facility under his
control to be used for any purpose prohibited by this ... subsection,
shall be fined not more that $100,000 or imprisoned not more than six months
or both.
Id. at 83.
195. S. REP. No. 23, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
196. 141 CONG. REC. S8328 (daily ed. June 14, 1995). The addition of a specific
intent requirement in the Communications Decency Act may cure some of the bill's
constitutionality problems. Cf. Royall, supra note 81, at 1407-10 (discussing how specific
intent requirement in telephone harassment statutes may bring such statutes within consti-
tutional boundaries). By narrowing the scope of criminal conduct and clarifying the
nature of prohibited conduct, the specific intent requirement may eliminate overbreadth
and vagueness concerns. Id. at 1407-08. However, if the Communications Decency Act
narrows, its applicability only to those who act with an intent to annoy, harass, threaten
or alarm, it fails to accomplish the purpose behind its creation: enabling children to use
the Internet without encountering indecent- material. See Panelists Debate Electronic
Privacy Issues, supra note 13. Not every sender of indecent material acts with an intent
to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass. For example, a computer user who sends a dirty joke
on the Internet may intend only to make others laugh. This computer user would fall
outside the Communications Decency Act's application and children would still be able
to access the dirty joke.
197. 141 CONG. REC. S8347 (daily ed. June 14, 1995) (Rollcall Vote No. 263 Leg.).
198. 141 CoNG. REC. S1953 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1995) (statement of Sen. Exon).
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people and small children to be able to "cruise... [the] superhigh-
way without being endangered by a whole series of smut [and]..
. pornography." 199 Supporters of the measure claim that the bill
only extends to computer users the same level of protection already
available to telephone users."° While anti-pornography campaign-
ers heralded the Communications Decency Act,201 computer users
and free speech activists vehemently opposed the legislation.20 2
Those opposing the Communications Decency Act questioned the
constitutionality of a statute regulating indecent non-broadcast
speech.203
B. Protection of Children from Computer Pornography Act of
1995
Similarly, many have criticized the Protection of Children from
Computer Pornography Act 2°4 for its proposed regulation of inde-
cent material.2 5 The bill, introduced by Senator Grassley on June
5, 1995,206 is intended to protect children without restricting adult
access to indecent material.20 7  The Protection of Children from
Senator Exon has proclaimed, "the information superhighway should not become a red
light district." Id.
199. Panelists Debate Electronic Privacy Issues, supra note 13.
200. John Schwartz, Senate Bill to Punish On-Line Obscenity Draws Sharp Criticism,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1995, at D1.
201. See, e.g., Mike Mills & Elizabeth Corcoran, Senate Votes to Ban PC Network
'Obscenity', WASH. POST, June 15, 1995, at Al (Communications Decency Act praised
by National Law Center for Children and Families); Carol Innerst, Anti-Porn Bill Makes
Waves in Cyberspace; Issue Centers on Internet's Status Under Law, WASH. TIMES, Mar.
7, 1995, at A4 (Communications Decency Act supported by National Coalition for the
Protection of Children and Families).
202. Marco R. della Cava, Users Abuzz over Internet Obscenity Bill, USA TODAY,
Mar. 7, 1995, at ID; Elizabeth Weise, U.S. Computer Users Rally To Fight Decency Act,
OTTAWA CITIZEN, Mar. 7, 1995, at C9.
203. 141 CONG. REC. 15,152 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1995) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
204. S. 892, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
205. "Protection of Children from Computer Pornography Act of 1995": Testimony
on S. 892 Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, FED. DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE
CONG. TESTIMONY, July 24, 1995 (testimony of Jerry Berman, Executive Director, Center
for Democracy and Technology).
206. S. 892, supra note 204. The Act is co-sponsored by Senators Dole, Coats,
McConnell, Shelby, and Nickles. Id.
207. Regulation of Pornography, ELECTRONIC MESSAGING NEWS, Vol. 7, Issue 12,
June 14, 1995, available in Westlaw, ALLNEWS Database. The Act would amend 18
U.S.C. § 1464, which regulates broadcasting obscene language, in part, as follows:
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Computer Pornography Act criminalizes transmitting,08 attempting
to transmit,2°9 and offering to transmit indecent material to mi-
nors.2 t° It also penalizes any computer facility operator,21  electron-
ic communications service provider,212 or electronic bulletin board
service provider21 3 who knowingly or recklessly permits minors'
access to indecent material.
214
Senators and lobbyists testifying before the Senate Judiciary
(2) TRANSMISSION BY REMOTE COMPUTER FACILITY OPERATOR, ELECTRON-
IC COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROVIDER, OR ELECTRONIC BULLETIN BOARD
SERVICE PROVIDER-A remote computer facility operator, electronic communi-
cations service provider, electronic bulletin board service provider who, with
knowledge of the character of the material, knowingly-
(A) transmits or offers or attempts to transmit from the remote com-
puter facility, electronic communications service, or electronic bulletin
board service provider a communication that contains indecent material to
a person under 18 years of age; or
(B) causes or allows to be transmitted from the remote computer
facility, electronic communications service, or electronic bulletin board a
communication that contains indecent material to a person under 18 years
of age or offers or attempts to do so
shall be fined in accordance with this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years,
or both.
(3) PERMITIING ACCESS TO TRANSMIT INDECENT MATERIAL TO A MI-
NOR.-Any remote computer facility operator, electronic communications ser-
vice provider, or electronic bulletin board service provider who willfully permits
a person to use a remote computing service, electronic communications service,
or electronic bulletin board service that is under the control of that remote
computer facility operator, electronic communications service provider, or
electronic bulletin board service provider, to knowingly or recklessly transmit
indecent material from another remote computing service, electronic communi-
cations service, or electronic bulletin board service, to a person under 18 years
of age, shall be fined not more than $10,000, imprisoned not more than 2 years
or both.
S. 892, § 2(b)(2)-(3), supra note 204. Notably, this amendment also changes the title of
this section from "Broadcasting obscene language" to "Utterance of indecent or profane
language by radio communication; transmission to minor of indecent material from remote
computer facility, electronic communications service, or electronic bulletin board service."
Id. § 2(a)(1). j
208. S. 892, supra note 204, § 2(b)(2)(A).
209. Id.
210. Id.
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Committee on pornography on computer networks and the need for
congressional action called for a more thorough examination of the
computer pornography problem and user control technologies, rath-
er than immediate government censorship of indecent Internet ma-
terial.215 Critics of this legislation suggest that software filter tech-
nologies may offer effective solutions to the problem of children's
access to computer pornography while preserving adults' right to
access such material. 16
C. The Child Protection, User Empowerment and Free
Expression in Interactive Media Study Act
While the Communications Decency Act and the Protection of
Children from Computer Pornography Act would punish those who
transmit indecent speech over the Internet,21 7 the Child Protection,
User Empowerment and Free Expression in Interactive Media
Study Act 18 would require: (1) a comprehensive study of the appli-
215. See "Protection of Children from Computer Pornography Act of 1995": Testi-
mony on S. 892 Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, supra note 205.
216. See id.
217. See S. 314, supra note 190, § 2(a)(1); S. 892, supra note 204, § 2(b)(2)(A).
218. S. 714, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The Act is sponsored by Senators Leahy,
Kerrey, and Kohl. Id. In pertinent part, the Act reads as follows:
SECTION 1. STUDY ON MEANS OF RESTRICTING ACCESS TO UN-
WANTED MATERIAL IN THE INTERACTIVE TELECOM-
MUNICATIONS SYSTEMS.
(a) STUDY AND REPORT.-Not later than 150 days after the date of enact-
ment of this Act, the Attorney General shall complete a study and submit to the
Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary
of the House of Representatives a report containing-
(I) an evaluation of whether current criminal laws governing the
distribution of obscenity over computer networks and the creation and
distribution of child pornography by means of computers are fully enforce-
able in interactive media;
(2) an assessment of the Federal, State, and local law enforcement
resources that are currently available to enforce those laws;
(3) an evaluation of the technical means available to-
(A) enable parents to exercise control over the information that
their children receive and enable other users to exercise control over
the commercial and noncommercial information that they receive over
interactive telecommunications systems so that they may avoid vio-
lent, sexually explicit, harassing, offensive, or otherwise unwanted
material; and
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cability of current laws governing the distribution of pornography
to pornography distributed via the Internet;219 (2) an assessment of
available resources to enforce the current laws;220 (3) an evaluation
of parental control technology 22' and technical means to promote
the free flow of information consistent with the Constitution;222 and
(4) recommendations to encourage the development and use of user
control technology.223 This study would be conducted by the De-
partment of Justice.224
In response to Senator Leahy's request to review the Communi-
cations Decency Act, the Department of Justice outlined potential
difficulties in that bill's enforcement. 25 The Department of Justice
also suggested a comprehensive review of the problems targeted by
such legislation,226 thus, essentially endorsing the Leahy Amend-
ment.
(B) promote the free flow of information consistent, with Consti-
tutional values, in interactive media; and
(4) recommendations to encourage the development and deployment
of technical means, including hardware and software, to enable parents to
exercise control over the information that their children receive and enable
other users to exercise control over the information that they receive over
interactive telecommunications systems so that they may avoid violent,
sexually explicit, harassing, offensive or otherwise unwanted material.
(b) CONSULTATION.-In conducting the study and preparing the report
under subsection (a), the Attorney General shall consult with the National Tele-
communications and Information Administration of the Department of Com-
merce.
Id.
219. Id. § l(a)(l).
220. Id. § l(a)(2).
221. Id. § l(a)(3)(A).
222. Id. § 1(a)(3)(B).
223. Id. § l(a)(4).
224. Leahy Bill on Obscenity to Be Offered as Amendment to Telecom Legislation,
BNA DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, May 10, 1995.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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D. The Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act
The Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act227 would
227. H.R. 1978, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The Act is sponsored by Representa-
tives Cox and Wyden. Id. The Act, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
SEC. 230. PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE BLOCKING AND SCREENING
OF OFFENSIVE MATERIAL; FCC CONTENT AND ECO-
NOMIC REGULATION OF COMPUTER SERVICES PROHIB-
ITED.
(a) FINDINGS.-The Congress finds the following:
(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive
computer services available to individual Americans represent [sic] an
extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and informational
resources to our citizens.
(2) These services offer users a great degree of control over the infor-
mation that they receive, as well as the potential for even greater control
in the future as technology develops.
(3) The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum
for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural
development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.
(4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have flour-
ished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government
regulation.
(5) Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a
variety of political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services.
(b) POLICY-It is the policy of the United States to-
(1) promote the continued development of the Internet and other
interactive computer services and other interactive media;
(2) preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently
exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered
by State or Federal regulation;
(3) encourage the development of technologies which maximize user
control over the information received by individuals, families, and schools
who use the Internet and other interactive computer services;
(4) remove disincentives for the development and utilization of block-
ing and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their chil-
dren's access to objectionable or inappropriate online material; and
(5) ensure vigorous enforcement of criminal laws to deter and punish
trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer.
(d) FCC REGULATION OF THE INTERNET AND OTHER INTERACTIVE COM-
PUTER SERVICES PROHIBITED.-Nothing in this Act shall be construed to grant
any jurisdiction or authority to the Commission with respect to economic or
content regulation of the Internet or other interactive computer services.
id. § 2.
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prohibit FCC regulation of computer services 228 and encourage the
development of parental and user control technologies. 229  The
Cox/Wyden Amendment recognizes that the availability of user
control technologies would allow the Internet to continue to devel-
op and permit users to avoid offensive material. 230  The House
passed the Cox/Wyden Amendment by a vote of 420 to 4 on Au-
gust 4, 1995.231
The Cox/Wyden Amendment heralded support from many civil
liberties groups as well as President Clinton.232 Critics of such
legislation, such as the Christian Coalition, argue that independent
efforts of on-line services and parents to prevent children's access
to indecent material may not be sufficient.2 33
III. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR INDECENT SPEECH ON
THE INTERNET
A. Applying First Amendment Principles to Internet Functions
Sable, Rowan, Bolger, Pacifica, Wilkinson and Erznoznik dem-
onstrate that different media enjoy different levels of First Amend-
234ment protection.  Since these different media are analogous to
different Internet functions,235 applying a single regulatory standard
to all facets of the Internet-as the Communications Decency Act




231. 141 CONG. REC. H8478 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995).
232. John Schwartz, House Vote Bars Internet Censorship, WASH. POST, Aug. 5,
1995, at A11.
233. See Pearl, supra note 187.
234. See discussion supra part I.C; see also Donald E. Lively, The Information
Superhighway: A First Amendment Roadmap, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1067, 1067-69, 1079-1100
(1994) (discussing First Amendment standards applied to different media and impact of
interactive nature of future media on First Amendment standards for future media). But
cf. Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Converging First Amendment Principles
for Converging Communications Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1719, 1721 (1995) (arguing that
different communications media are not treated differently for First Amendment purposes
and that separate First Amendment jurisprudence for broadcasters should be discarded).
235. See supra part I.B.
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have proposed to do-is incongruous.236  The similarities of
Internet functions to traditional media237 make the cases discussed
above applicable to a First Amendment analysis of indecent
Internet speech.23' However, the interactive nature of the Internet
media eliminates the privacy interest concerns 239 that such cases
sought to address.24° Thus, if statutes broadly regulating indecent
Internet speech are evaluated under such cases and substantial pri-
vacy interest concerns no longer exist, these statutes will probably
be deemed unconstitutional. 241 Consequently, indecent speech dis-
seminated Via bulletin boards, electronic mail, and real-time
conferencing cannot be constitutionally restricted in accordance
with the speech limitation standard applied in the Sable telephone
236. See Note, supra note 76, at 1087 (discussing functional distinctions and
interactivity of methods for communication on information superhighway); see also supra
note 94 (discussing merging of technologies in future media). The Communications
Decency Act would amend a statute that currently applies only to telephone usage. See
47 U.S.C. § 223 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Thus, the bill's authors appear to incorrectly
analogize the use of all facets of the Internet to the use of the telephone. See 73 AM.
JUR. 2D Statutes § 188 (1974) (statutes should be considered as whole and not as "isolated
fragments of law"); Steven Levy, Indecent Proposal: Censor the Net, NEWSWEEK, Apr.
3, 1995, at 53 (Communications Decency Act treats digital transmissions like phone
calls). The bill demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of how the Internet func-
tions. Fear of new media technologies may have encouraged some to rush to regulate
speech on the Internet without first acquiring a rudimentary knowledge of the many
different methods of communication on the network. See generally GARRY, supra note
93, at 139-42.
Additionally, the Internet is a global network. Elizabeth Weise, How Do You Police
a System When You Don't Know What it Is?, S.F. ExAM., Mar. 6, 1995, at DI; Journalists
Talk About Cyberspace, Crime and Culture, Charlie Rose, JOURNAL GRAPHICS TRAN-
SCRIPTS, Feb. 21, 1995, Transcript # 1318-2 (11:00 p.m. ET) ("the Internet has the power
to export the First Amendment"). Thus, the U.S. government's unilateral imposition of
strict speech restrictions may hinder the United States' participation in the global informa-
tion exchange. See Weise, supra.
237. See supra part I.B.
238. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Constitution in Cyberspace, THE HUMANIST,
Sept./Oct. 1991, at 15, 19-20 (discussing applicability of constitutional principles to
computer communication).
239. See supra note 93 (noting that interactive media allow users to control more
effectively information they receive).
240. See supra text accompanying note 108.
241. Id. The invasion of substantial privacy interests is necessary in order to consti-
tutionally regulate indecent speech. Id.
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case, -the Rowan and Bolger mail cases, the Pacifica broadcasting
case, the Wilkinson cable case, and the Erznoznik film case.
1. Electronic Bulletin Boards
As discussed above,242 electronic bulletin boards are somewhat
analogous to broadcasting, cable, public fora, and telephone.
Therefore, Pacifica, Wilkinson, Erznoznik, and Sable are relevant
in defining the parameters of the First Amendment protection avail-
able to indecent speech posted on an., electronic bulletin board.
While electronic bulletin boards bear certain similarities to
broadcasting, electronic bulletin boards do not have the characteris-
tics enumerated in Pacifica243 which make broadcasting a unique
medium whose speech is subject only to limited First Amendment
protection.2 " Without these characteristics, indecent electronic
bulletin board speech does not come within the ambit of Pacifica's
narrow holding.245 Thus, Pacifica's restriction on indecent broad-
cast speech would probably not extend to indecent electronic bulle-
tin board speech.
Computer bulletin board systems' similarities to cable sys-
tems 246 make the court's reasoning in Wilkinson applicable to an
evaluation of electronic bulletin boards' constitutional standing.
Like cable users,247 the significant control which electronic bulletin
board users exercise on the receipt of information 24 negates the
need for government regulation to protect electronic bulletin -board
users' privacy interests. Thus, indecent electronic bulletin board
speech would be constitutionally protected under a Wilkinson anal-
ysis.
Since electronic bulletin board users and recipients of commu-
242. See supra part I.B.1.
243. See supra note 157 (discussing characteristics of broadcasting).
244. See supra note 157.
245. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750 (emphasizing narrowness of Court's holding).
246. See supra text accompanying notes 62-66.
247. See Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099, 1113
(D. Utah 1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 480 U:S. 926 (1987); supra
text accompanying notes 169-72.
248. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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nication in public settings have similar privacy interests, 249 the
Erznoznik analysis is also relevant. Imposing criminal liability on
the bulletin board user who posts an indecent message would be
analogous to prosecuting the projector of a film containing nudity
in Erznoznik.250  Like the film projector, an electronic bulletin
board user can put indecent material in public view.251 However,
just like the persons on public streets viewing the films containing
nudity in Erznoznik,252 a bulletin board user viewing indecent mate-
rial has a limited privacy interest.25 3 Thus, under Erznoznik, the
limited privacy interests of a bulletin board user who views the
indecent material, and the ease with which the offended viewer
could avert his or her eyes,254 do not justify government restrictions
on indecent bulletin board postings. Hence, indecent bulletin board
postings would probably be constitutionally protected.
Sable is also relevant to a First Amendment analysis of comput-
er bulletin board speech. In Sable, the Court allowed indecent
speech to flow over telephone lines. 255 As previously discussed, a
telephone call is far more intrusive than a visual message, such as
a bulletin board posting or electronic mail, due to a telephone call's
highly confrontational nature.256 Therefore, since the Supreme
Court did not uphold a prohibition for indecent speech transmitted
by a highly intrusive phone communication,2 7 it is highly unlikely
249. See supra text accompanying note 72.
250. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 206-07 (1975).
251. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
252. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 206-07.
253. See supra text accompanying note 72.
254. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (holding that where persons
with limited privacy interests can avoid communication "simply by averting their eyes,"
communication cannot be prohibited by government).
255. See Sable Communications v. Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989);
supra text accompanying note 149.
256. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
257. Sable, 492 U.S. at 131. Sable can be distinguished because it involved a
section of 47 U.S.C. § 223 which prohibited indecent commercial speech. See supra note
141. However, as discussed earlier, commercial speech is less protected than noncom-
mercial speech. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 64-65. Therefore, if the Court will protect inde-
cent commercial speech, it should be even more careful to protect indecent non-commer-
cial speech.
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that it would uphold a similar restriction for messages transmitted
via a less intrusive computer bulletin board system. Thus, a statute
restricting indecent bulletin board postings is likely to be unconsti-
tutional.
2. Electronic Mail Systems
Since electronic mail functions most similarly to a postal mail
system, 258 Rowan and Bolger provide the appropriate context for a
First Amendment analysis of this medium. Both Rowan and
Bolger stressed the importance of the individual's right to decide
what physical mailings could enter the home. 259  Analogously,
electronic mail recipients should have the right to decide for them-
selves what kind of speech enters their homes. 260 A statute which
prohibits the computer transmission of indecent speech does not
provide the recipient of indecent electronic mail with the option of
accepting or refusing the speech before the sender is punished.26'
Instead, it criminalizes all indecent speech sent by electronic
mail.262 Thus, the Court would likely find the statute unconstitu-
tional as applied to indecent electronic mail.
3. Real-Time Conferencing
Since real-time conferencing has both telephone and mail char-
acteristics, the Sable, Rowan, and Bolger analyses apply to this
form of electronic transmission. The Sable Court held that inde-
cent commercial telephone messages were constitutionally protect-
ed, since the recipient himself had to call a phone number to re-
258. See Becker, supra note 78, at 805 n.14; supra text accompanying note 78.
259. See supra text accompanying notes 129 and 136.
260. Electronic mail should be accorded the full legal protection afforded to postal
mail. See Schlachter, supra note 48, at 140. Electronic mail is regulated by the Electron-
ic Communications Privacy Act of 1986. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986)
(codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). The Act does not protect electronic mail as
extensively as postal mail. Schlachter, supra note 48, at 139.
261. Compare Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970)
(holding that, upon request by unreceptive addressee, government is permitted to prohibit
sender from mailing further material to that addressee) with Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods.
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983) (holding that government may not unilaterally prevent
sender from mailing to protect recipients who might potentially be offended unless objec-
tionable speech is unavoidable).
262. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 23, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 14, 83 (1995) (text of Commu-
nications Decency Act).
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ceive the messages. 263 Real-time conferencing, however, is not the
same kind of utility as a "dial-a-porn" service. The recipient of a
real-time message does not necessarily seek that message.264
Therefore, Sable may only apply where the real-time recipient
sought the indecent message before receiving it.
Real-time conferencing's similarities to postal mail provides a
stronger analogy for First Amendment analysis. As with electronic
mail, Rowan and Bolger seem to prohibit government from shutting
off communication to real-time recipients of indecent speech.265
However, real-time conferencing's similarities to telephone commu-
nication make the analysis more complicated. Consistent with the
Court's speech limitation standard, the immediacy of the real-time
recipient's confrontation with the real-time caller may indicate that
the real-time recipient has a lower intolerability threshold than an
electronic mail recipient.2 66 The real-time recipient has more diffi-
culty avoiding the offensive communication. This avoidance bur-
den, however, is significantly less than that of a telephone call re-
cipient because real-time conferencing is a visual medium; the real-
time conferencer cannot hear the voice, tone or inflection of the
caller. Although the real-time recipient bears more of an avoidance
burden than the electronic mail recipient, the real-time burden is
still an acceptable burden to bear.2 67 Real-time conferencers can
easily avert their eyes or turn off the computer. Therefore, a stat-
ute restricting indecent speech is probably unconstitutional as ap-
plied to real-time conferencing.
Interactive media allow users to exercise control over the infor-
mation they receive.268 The above cases demonstrate that the gov-
ernment can only constitutionally regulate indecent speech in inter-
active media to the extent that user control would not allow the
user to effectively avoid the communication and maintain the user's
privacy interest. The interactive nature of Internet functions limits
263. Sable Communications of California v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989).
264. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 29, at 179; supra text accompanying note 84.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 259-62.
266. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
268. Berman & Weitzner, supra note 92, at 1632.
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computer users' privacy interests and allows users to avoid unwant-
ed communication. Thus, statutes which restrict indecent Internet
speech, without considering the Internet's different functions and
interactive nature, are presumably unconstitutional.
B. Alternative Solutions Exist To Minimize Children's Access
to Indecent Material
Statutes regulating Internet media content are not necessary to
minimize children's access to indecent or harmful speech: Where
user control technologies allow the user to identify the content of
the transmission and to screen certain content, there is no need for
government interference.269
Today, many options exist which protect children and allow
adults to freely decide what kind of speech flows into their
home. 270 First, many computer bulletin boards are explicitly la-
belled to make users aware of their contents.27' This gives willing
recipients the right to receive communication while allowing un-
willing recipients'the opportunity to avoid the communication.272
Thus, the decision to receive the speech on the Internet is left to
the individual, not the government.
Second, existing laws may apply to certain forms of Internet
communication. For example, laws that prohibit the dissemination
of child pornography apply to pornography distributed via the
Internet.273 Similarly, computer bulletin board users may also be
269. See DONALD E. LIVELY, ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNICATIONS LAW
263-64 (1992). The constitutional concept of privacy pertains to intrusions into a protect-
ed sphere as well as to notions of personal autonomy. Id. Placing the focus of the
privacy concept on individual choice to avoid or welcome a particular communication,
rather than on government protection from unwanted intrusions, comports more with the
U.S. constitutional value system that favors autonomy rather than "authoritative selection."
See id. at 264.
270. Brad Stone, Low-Tech Parents Aren't Powerless, NEWSWEEK, July 3, 1995, at
50.
271. Berman & Weitzner, supra note 92, at 1632-33.
272. See John Bebow and Dave Farrell, Free Speech vs. Lawless Cyberspace: A New
Conflict, GANNETt NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 15, 1995, available in Westlaw, ALLNEWS
Database (stating that by considering Communications Decency Act, Congress is acting
as though it is regulating mass media and not medium in which users can control informa-
tion they receive).
273. Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986 § (c)(1), Pub. L. No. 99-628,
100 Stat. 3510 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2251(c)(1) (1994)). The Act states:
Any person who ... knowingly makes, prints, or publishes, or causes to be
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liable under federal provisions prohibiting distribution, transporta-
tion and publishing of obscene materials.274
Third, new technology, such as software filters and special
services that provide a "clean" version of the Internet to younger
users, would protect children while allowing adults to access their
choice of material. 75 Various interest groups could design rating
systems which, if parents subscribed, would limit children's access
to material if it met a certain rating. 276 For example, high-technolo-
gy companies which are lobbying to defeat any government censor-
ship measure have formed a consortium to create the technology
standards to filter offensive material from the Internet.277 This
group, the Platform for Internet Content Selection278 ("PICS") seeks
to develop technology standards so that all filtering programs
would have certain common software codes, 279 and to create a mov-
ie-like rating system to rate Internet content.280 In fact, many soft-
ware companies already sell filtering software.28'
made, printed, or published, any notice or advertisement seeking or offering-
(A) to receive, exchange, buy, produce, display, distribute, or reproduce,
any visual depiction, if the production of such visual depiction involves the
use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct...;
(B) participation in any act of sexually explicit conduct by or with any
minor for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of such conduct.
Id.
The legislative history of the Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986
states that computer bulletin board users engaging in the prohibited activity are liable
under the statute. H.R. REP. No. 910, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1986).
274. Jensen, supra note 46, at 228.
275. Levy, supra note 236.
276. Berman & Weitzner, supra note 92, at 1633; see Steve Lohr, Industry Seeks
Means to Filter Internet Content, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1995, at D7.
277. Lohr, supra note 276; see Steve Higgins, On-Line Players Aim to Let User Be
the Judge of Content, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Sept. 14, 1995, at A8.
278. Laurent Belsie, Keeping 'Cybersmut' Beyond Kids' Reach, CHRISTIAN SC.
MONITOR, Sept. 11, 1995, at 4.
279. Lohr, supra note 276.
280. Belsie, supra note 278.
281. Carmen Fleetwood, Software Firms Launching Products that Let Parents Screen
the Internet, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1995, at B5; Lohr, supra note 276; see, e.g., Dwight
Silverman, Cyberspace Porn Debate Tangling Net up in Knots, HOUSTON CHRON., July
23, 1995, at 1; Kara Swisher, Ban on On-Line Smut Opposed; High-Tech Coalition
Pushes Software Allowing Parents to Decide, WASH. POST, July 18, 1995, at D3.
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Lastly, parents can actively guide and supervise children's use
of the Internet.282 Adults should help children explore the available
resources on the Internet and select appropriate material.
Thus, many alternatives to statutes restricting indecent Internet
speech maintain adults' personal autonomy while protecting chil-
dren from indecent speech. Where such effective alternatives exist,
statutes severely restricting indecent Internet speech are unconstitu-
tional because they are not the least restrictive means of achieving
the government's objective to protect children from offensive mate-
rial.283 Unlike statutes regulating indecent computer network
speech, statutes which encourage the development of filtering tech-
nology comport with First Amendment ideals of free speech and
personal autonomy.284
CONCLUSION
As electronic fora and computer-based expression become more
prevalent, traditional modes of expression may become impractical
and inefficient.285 Constitutional principles, however, must hold
fast under "merely technological transformations., 286 Although the
core First Amendment principles of freedom of speech and press
make freedom of expression a steadfast rule,287 "differences in the
characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amend-
ment standards applied to them. 2 88 Each medium presents its own
peculiar problems, and so, the standards applied to that medium
282. Stone, supra note 270; Levy, supra note 236. Parental autonomy is a constitu-
tionally protected interest. LIVELY, supra note 269, at 263.
283. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 126.
284. See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2458 (1994). "At
the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for him
or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence."
Id.
285. Taviss, supra note 50, at 782-83.
286. Tribe, supra note 238, at 20. "[F]idelity to original values requires flexibility
of textual interpretation." Id. at 21.
287. See Robert Corn-Revere, New Technology and the First Amendment: Breaking
the Cycle of Repression, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 247, 275 (1994).
288. See id. at 268 (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386
(1969)).
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must be well-suited to address that medium's unique characteristics.
Simply transferring one set of standards from one medium to an-
other without careful analysis will limit technological progress and
infringe on freedom of expression.
The proposed legislation regulating indecent speech on the
Internet is not narrowly tailored and demonstrates a lack of under-
standing of the many vehicles for expression on the information
superhighway.2 9 Since alternative solutions exist which would
preserve the Internet as an interactive marketplace of ideas and
maintain the rights of individuals to exercise personal autonomy,
the government should help implement these solutions rather than
impose speech restrictions.
As the Court stated in Bolger, "The level of discourse reaching
a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which would be suitable
for a sandbox.' '290 The Court's command should not be disregarded
just because, today, the mailbox is electronic.
289. "Where First Amendment freedoms are at stake ... precision of drafting and
clarity of purpose are essential." Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 217-18
(1975).
290. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983).
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